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Abstract
In many OECD countries income inequality has risen, but surprisingly
redistribution as well. The theory attributes this partly to the redistributive
effect of education spending. In the model income inequality and growth
depend in an inverted U-shaped way on education. To maintain a given level
of human capital it is shown that a less efficient schooling technology
requires more resources, which lowers pre-tax and post-tax income
inequality as well as growth. Using consistently defined income data from the
Luxembourg Income Study suggests that there is a negative relationship
between growth and income inequality in rich countries. It is argued that
using some unadjusted inequality measures in growth regressions may yield
estimates that are biased upwards. The evidence suggests that a rich
country would raise growth with lower pre-tax and post-tax inequality if it
spent more on education.
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According to Kuznets (1955) an inverted U-shaped relationship between income
and inequality should be observed in the course of development. Thus, redistri-
bution which makes the income distribution more unequal should be beneﬁcial
in the earlier stages of development. The opposite would hold at later stages of
development.
Following Perotti (1996) and the references cited there, the recent theoreti-
cal literature on inequality, redistribution and growth can be divided into four
main approaches. The ﬁscal policy approach argues that the income distribu-
tion aﬀects growth through its eﬀects on government expenditure and taxation.
Due to the disincentive eﬀect on private savings and investment growth decreases
as distortionary taxation increases. Redistributive government expenditure and
distortionary taxation decrease as equality increases.
The political instability approach argues that in more unequal societies individ-
uals are more prone to engage in rent-seeking activities or other manifestations of
sociopolitical instability. As the latter decrease, investment and growth increase.
Furthermore, sociopolitical instability decreases as equality increases.
Another strand of the literature stresses the link between borrowing con-
straints, the distribution of income and wealth and investment in human capital.
These models usually show that growth increases as investment in human capital
increases. For any given degree of imperfection in the capital market, investment
in human capital increases as equality increases.
Related to the latter link some authors concentrate on the connection between
education and fertility. Here fertility and schooling decisions are the result of the
interplay of the direct cost of raising children and the opportunity cost of the
1parents’ human capital. Growth is shown to be higher when investment in human
capital is raised, and fertility is lower. In turn, fertility decreases and investment
in human capital is raised as equality increases.
All these approaches predict that growth increases as inequality decreases.
Indeed a number of studies such as Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and
Tabellini (1994) or Perotti (1996) ﬁnd that growth is negatively associated with
income inequality across countries. This has established what may be called the
Conventional Consensus View (CCV).
However, based on inequality data compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996)
that consensus has been challenged by e.g. Li and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000), or
Barro (2000) who ﬁnd a non-robust or even positive association, especially for
rich countries.1 These results may therefore be called the New Challenge View
(NCV).
Although Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000) have recently attempted to reconcile the
two conclusions, they ended up with a negative result. Based on Deininger and
Squire’s data and most NCV authors’ use of unadjusted inequality measures they
show that the data cannot really tell us very much about the relationship between
inequality and growth, especially once you account for possible nonlinearities.
Whatever the association between growth and inequality might be, it would
entail important consequences for the eﬀect of redistribution on growth. One
should bear in mind that income inequality and (income) redistribution are two
distinct things. But they are related as follows: The economic system produces
an income distribution and then the state intervenes to redistribute income by
levying taxes and granting subsidies to satisfy some welfare target. After the
1Even though these authors are careful to mention that it would be too early to draw policy
conclusions from their ﬁndings, they call for a reassessment of the relationship. However, their
data and their results are based on problematic features. See Atkinson and Brandolini (2001),
Rehme (1999) and the discussion below.
2state intervention another income distribution emerges that may look quite dif-
ferent from the one before the intervention. The net eﬀect of the intervention
is usually called redistribution. Thus, a comparison between the distribution of
personal incomes before and after taxes provides one with a picture of the level
of redistribution.
The evidence about the link between redistribution and growth across coun-
tries is mixed.2 Clearly any study which ﬁnds that inequality is bad for growth
somehow implies that redistribution generating more equality should be beneﬁcial
for growth. Of course, the opposite holds when ﬁnding a positive association.
For instance, Perotti (1993), Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) or
Persson and Tabellini (1994) show that redistribution causes lower growth. How-
ever, empirical studies such as Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Perotti (1994) or
Sala-i-Martin (1996) ﬁnd that there is a positive relation across countries. These
results can be reconciled with theory by models along the lines of e.g. Galor and
Zeira (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1996), Chiu (1998), Aghion et al. (1999) or
Jovanovic (2000).
Much recent research explains these links by skill-biased technical change or
by politico-economic arguments. This paper, in turn, focuses on the schooling link
and argues that public education, its ﬁnance and the way it is undertaken (school-
ing technology) are important determinants of income inequality and growth.3
In the model human capital simultaneously determines growth and income
inequality. In this framework the paper identiﬁes two redistribution mechanisms.
2This literature is surveyed by e.g. B´ enabou (1996), Bertola (2000), Aghion, Caroli and
Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa (1999), or Zweim¨ uller (2000).
3 Thus, the paper builds on recent research by Eicher and Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa (2001) who show
that human capital plays a dual role in development due to the interaction between forces of
supply and demand for education when there is skill biased technical change. Here the focus
is on the education technology itself. For empirical evidence of the link between skill-biased
technical change and inequality see e.g. Murphy, Riddel and Romer (1998), Krusell, Ohanian,
R´ ıos-Rull and Violante (2000) or Beaudry and Green (2000).
3One the one hand redistribution occurs by means of direct ﬁscal redistribution
from the well-oﬀ to the not so well-oﬀ. On the other hand there is redistribution
through taxes used for expenditure on public education, which redistributes in-
come by changing the relative wages. It is shown that growth and pre-tax and
post-tax income inequality - measured by the Gini coeﬃcient - are ﬁrst increas-
ing and then decreasing in human capital. For a given level of human capital a
less eﬃcient education technology implies lower growth, but also lower after-tax
income inequality and higher measured income redistribution. The intuition for
this is straightforward: To maintain a given level of public education a less eﬃ-
cient education sector requires higher, redistributive taxes. In contrast, a more
skill intensive technology does not aﬀect the education sector directly, but it im-
plies higher growth and more inequality and lower measured redistribution for a
given level of human capital.
Most of the recent NCV proponents have based their results on unadjusted
inequality measures using the secondary data-set of Deininger and Squire (1996).
As shown by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) there are pitfalls when using these
data. In particular, they argue (p. 796) that ’there is no real alternative to seeking
data-sets where the observations are as fully consistent as possible; at the same
time, the choice of deﬁnition on which to standardize may aﬀect the conclusions
drawn.’
Therefore, this paper uses reliable and consistently deﬁned income data from
the Luxembourg Income Study for a sample of relatively rich countries. With
these data the model’s implications are then set against the empirical evidence.
The data suggest the following:
The association between the education as well as the distributional variables
and growth is not very strong. More secondary as well as tertiary education or
4more spending on overall education appear to be associated with higher growth.
Pre-tax and post-tax income inequality are negatively related to growth, even
when controlling for fertility.4 Thus, the situation after redistribution is not
conducive to growth, suggesting that more redistribution might raise long-run
growth. These results remain robust when using larger samples with less consis-
tent inequality data from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID).5
The consistently found negative association between growth and inequality
of incomes before and after taxes is interpreted in light of research that mixes
Gini coeﬃcients for income before and after taxes. It is argued that the coeﬃ-
cients on unadjusted Gini coeﬃcients are most likely to be biased upwards. The
implications of that are discussed in the text.
Controlling for standard variables such as initial income or fertility, the data
reveal that the government expenditure on (all levels of) education is negatively
associated with pre-tax and post-tax income inequality and positively related to
redistribution. That suggests a redistributive, but also positive growth eﬀect of
education spending.
However, education spending is policy driven and the policies may be very
diverse across countries. Under some strong assumptions the data provide sug-
gestive evidence that controlling for education spending and policy interaction, a
higher dropout rate in tertiary education, taken as a proxy for a less eﬃcient use
of resources for education or for a less productive education sector, imply lower
income inequality and redistribution, but also higher growth. In turn, when
controlling for the dropout and policy interaction, more education spending is
4For instance, Barro (2000) ﬁnds for his data and for unadjusted inequality measures that
inequality is positively associated with growth when looking at a sub-sample of rich countries
and when including fertility as an additional control variable.
5Similar results are obtained in Rehme (1999) for pre-tax inequality measured by consistently
deﬁned inequality data from Deininger and Squire (1996).
5associated with less pre-tax and post-tax income inequality and less redistribu-
tion but with higher growth.
Thus, the data suggest that the typical (rich) country would have higher
growth and less inequality if it spent more on education given its education tech-
nology.6 If the latter becomes worse, higher inequality and lower growth might
ensue, once policy reactions have responded to that change.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model
and derives testable predictions. Section 3 confronts the model with empirical
evidence. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an economy that is populated by N (large) members of two represen-
tative dynasties of inﬁnitely lived individuals. The two dynasties are made up of
high-skilled people, Lh, and low-skilled people, Ll, where Lh;Ll denote the total
numbers of the respective agents in each dynasty. The diﬀerence between the
agents is ”lumpy”, that is, either an individual has received education certiﬁed in
the form of a degree and is then considered high-skilled or it has no degree and
remains in the low-skilled labour pool.
By assumption the population is stationary with Lh ´ xN and Ll ´ (1¡x)N
where x denotes the percentage of high-skilled people in the population. Each
individual supplies one unit of either high or low-skilled labour inelastically over
time. Furthermore, the high-skilled agents own an equal share of the total capital
stock, which is held in the form of shares of many identical ﬁrms operating in a
world of perfect competition. Thus, high-skilled agents receive wage and capital
6This ﬁnding is a cross-country analogue to recent research by Goodspeed (2000), who shows
this to be the case for the U.S. over time.
6income and make investment decisions, whereas low-skilled agents do not, as they
do not own capital by assumption.7
Aggregating over ﬁrms overall output is produced according to




® = [(Lh + Ll)
® + ¯L
®
h]; 0 < ® < 1; (1)
where Kt denotes the aggregate capital stock including disembodied technological
knowledge, H measures eﬀective labour in production, and Bt is a productivity
index. The production function is a reduced form (see Appendix A.2) of the fol-
lowing relationship: By assumption eﬀective labour depends on tasks requiring
basic skills and tasks requiring high skills. These tasks are imperfect substitutes in
production. On the other hand low and high-skilled people are taken to be perfect
substitutes in performing basic tasks. Thus, high-skilled people always perform
the tasks of low-skilled people in the model, but low-skilled people can never exe-
cute tasks that require a degree. Modelling production in this way relates to work
that distinguishes between tasks performed for a given educational attainment of
the labour force and education mixes for given tasks. See e.g. Tinbergen (1975),
chpt. 5, and Lindbeck and Snower (1996)
The parameter ¯ measures skill-biased productivity diﬀerences, that is, it
captures how productively tasks, which require high skills, contribute to the gen-
eration of output in relation to tasks requiring low skills.8 Notice that each type
7This captures two empirical observations: First, the more educated usually derive a larger
share of the total capital income than the uneducated. Second, the educated commonly have
educated oﬀspring, whereas the uneducated often do not, that is, the proportion of young people
who receive higher education whose parents have not is low. For an alternative justiﬁcation
of the assumption in a two period OLG setting see Appendix A.1. It is important to notice
that in this model the family background does not determine whether a child receives higher
education or not.
8A constant ¯ implies that the diversity in it across countries is structurally ﬁxed for a long
time. Thus, the paper abstracts from skill-biased technical change and should, therefore, be
viewed as complementary to research along the lines of Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Acemoglu
7of labour alone is not taken to be an essential input in production.
The government runs a balanced budget and uses its tax revenues to ﬁnance
public education and to grant direct transfers to the low-skilled workers.9 Thus,
the paper contemplates two redistributive mechanisms. On the one hand re-
sources are redistributed directly from the currently working, relatively rich high
skilled people to the currently working, relatively poor low skilled individuals. On
the other hand there is intertemporal redistribution from the currently working
high skilled to the future high skilled individuals whose parents in turn may be
low or high skilled.
For this the government taxes the accumulated factor of production, that is,
it taxes the high skilled agents’ capital income at a constant rate # ´ ¿ + Á.
The capital stock (wealth) of the representative high-skilled agent is kht = Kt
Lh so
that Gt = #rtkhtLh = #rtKt where rt denotes the return on capital. This implies
that Gt
rtKt = # for all t. Thus, real resources #rtKt = (¿ + Á)rtKt are taken from
the private sector where the amount ¿rtKt is used to ﬁnance public education,
which generates high-skilled agents.10 In turn the amount ÁrtKt is granted as
(1998), or Caselli (1999).
9Capital income taxes keep the analysis simple and are supposed to capture a broad class of
redistributive tax arrangements. For a similar approach in a diﬀerent context see Alesina and
Rodrik (1994). In this context the data appendix provides some evidence that across countries
capital income taxes are indeed signiﬁcantly positively related to expenditure on education.
Constancy of the tax rate is imposed in order to focus on long-run, time-consistent equilibria
with steady state, balanced growth. For a discussion of private vs. public education see, for
instance, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) or Fernandez and Rogerson (1998).
10In the model agents are endowed by the same basic ability and receive basic training which
is produced and provided costlessly. Education is always meant to be higher education. Ex
ante everybody is a candidate for receiving (higher) education and once chosen to be in the
education process will complete the degree. Thus, the education sector is characterized by
continuous excess demand due to rationing, which seems realistic for most education systems.
Furthermore, the education process is taken to be suﬃciently productive in converting no skills
into high-skills. The model ignores problems arising from the time spent receiving education by
assuming that education is provided as a public good and that all people spend the same time in
school, but attend diﬀerent courses leading to diﬀerent degrees. Opportunity costs of education
might easily be introduced into the model by subtracting a ﬁxed amount of happiness from a
high-skilled person for having spent time in school. The paper’s results would not change in
8transfers to the low-skilled and captures that the government directly aﬀects the
net income distribution by correcting for post-education income diﬀerentials.
Of course, redistribution may take other forms in reality. For instance, sup-
pose that in contrast to this model’s assumptions education is privately costly.
Public expenditures on higher education might then be regressive if higher income
families have better access to educational opportunities. Redistribution in the
form of social transfers might in fact have a growth impact by loosening liquidity
constraints that prevent individuals in poor families from taking advantage of ed-
ucational opportunities. In that sense redistribution corrects for ex ante (wealth
or income) inequality in the paper, because education is provided costlessly and
ex ante the family background of a student does not matter in the model. Sec-
ond, there is redistribution ex post which corrects for inequality in income after
education has taken place.
In general, public education depends on government resources and other fac-
tors such as high-skilled labour itself. That is captured by the following reduced





where 0 < ² < 1; c ¸ 1 x¿ > 0; and x¿¿ < 0: (2)
Thus, if the government channels more resources into education, it will generate
more high-skilled people. However, doing this becomes more diﬃcult at the
margin, as more resources provided to the education sector lead to a decreasing
marginal product of those resources due to congestion eﬀects.
The parameter c measures the eﬃciency by which government resources are
used in education. It captures to what extent public funds ultimately aﬀect
that case. Notice that Gt is taken to be rising over time.
9education output. One way to think about 1
c is as a survival rate in a particular
education programme. If the latter is higher it would make funds more eﬃcient
when generating graduates and the study times were of equal length.
In turn, ² measures the productivity of the whole education sector. A lower ²
implies that the education sector is more productive and that a marginal increase
in taxes would increase education output relatively more.11 This productivity
may depend on the duration of studies, the quality of education, student-teacher
ratios or how capital (computers) and students are combined for given resources
in eﬃciency units (¿
c).
Underlying equation (2) is the description of an education sector with spillovers
from, for instance, high-skilled to new high-skilled people or where the capital
equipment such as computers makes the education technology very productive.
For a justiﬁcation of the set-up see Appendix A.3.
The Private Sector. There are as many identical, price-taking ﬁrms as indi-
viduals and the ﬁrms face perfect competition and maximize proﬁts. By assump-







t with ´ ¸ ®. Thus, the average stock of capital, kt = Kt
N , which includes dis-
embodied technological knowledge, is the source of a positive externality.12 Then
simplify by setting ´ = ® which allows one to concentrate on steady state be-
haviour. For a justiﬁcation see Romer (1986). As the ﬁrms cannot inﬂuence the
11The reduced form directly relates the percentage of high-skilled people (x) to the percentage
of eﬃciently used resources (wealth) going into the education sector (˜ ¿ ´ ¿
c). If pr = x
˜ ¿ = ˜ ¿²¡1
denotes the productivity of the education sector in terms of eﬃciently used resources, then pr
is decreasing in ² for given policy.
12Here the assumption is that regardless of the source of new ideas or blueprints production
is undertaken so that all agents are aﬀected relatively equally from knowledge spillovers. The
results would not change if the externality depended on the entire capital stock instead.
10externality, it does not enter their decision directly so that


















t (Lh + Ll)
®¡1 :
(3)
All agents act price-takingly and have logarithmic utility. The low-skilled
do not invest and consume their entire wage and transfer income so that their












In contrast, the high-skilled own all the assets which are collateralized one-to-one












s:t: ˙ kh = wh + (1 ¡ #)rkh ¡ ch (5b)
kh(0) = given; kh(1) = free: (5c)





(1 ¡ #)r ¡ ½
º
: (6)
which depends on the after-tax return on capital. As the high-skilled agents own
the initial capital stock equally and as they have identical utility functions, their
investment decisions are the same. But then the wealth distribution will not
13From now time subscripts are dropped for convenience.
11change over time and only high-skilled agents continue to own equal shares of the
total capital stock over time.
Market Equilibrium. For the rest of the paper normalize the population by
setting N = 1 so that the factor rewards in (3) are given by
r = (1 ¡ ®)A(1 + ¯x
®) ; wh = ®Akt(1 + ¯x®¡1) and wl = ®Akt: (7)
The return on capital is constant over time and wages grow with the capital
stock. Note that wl(t) does not directly depend on x. It only does so indirectly
through kt and so °(x) when t 6= 0. It is frequently shown that an increase in
human capital raises the wages of the low-skilled. In this model such an increase
(higher x) would not aﬀect the low-skilled people’s wages initially. But over time
it would either raise the wage ﬂow when x < ˆ x and growth is raised, or lower it
when growth is reduced by too much human capital substituting for low-skilled
people.14
As wh = wl (1+¯x®¡1), high-skilled labour receives a premium over what their
low-skilled counterpart gets, regardless of whether high skilled labour is taken as
scarce - as in most models - or not. This reﬂects that the high-skilled may always
(perfectly) substitute for low-skilled labour so that both types of labour receive
the same wage wl for routine tasks and that performing high-skilled tasks is
remunerated by the additional amount wl ¯ x®¡1. The wage premium depends
on the percentage of high-skilled labour in the population, grows over time at the
14It is often argued that human capital raises the wages of the low-skilled due to the comple-
mentarity of these two (usually assumed essential) labour inputs in production. See e.g. Cic-
cone, Peri and Almond (1999). Here neither input is essential in production and any observed
reaction of more high-skilled people is attributed to the indirect eﬀect that capital exerts on
the wages of the low-skilled. See e.g. Johnson (1984). Thus, more human capital is taken to
have a stronger immediate impact on the wages of the high-skilled than on the wages of the
low-skilled. For empirical evidence on this see e.g. B¨ uttner and Fitzenberger (1998).
12rate ° and is decreasing in x for a given capital stock.15
On the other hand the (relative) wage premium
wh
wl increases when production
is getting more (high-)skill biased (higher ¯). This feature of the model is in line
with explanations which attribute the recent increase in wage inequality in the
U.S.A. to skill biased technological change. The latter is often shown to have had
a stronger impact on the U.S. distribution of wages than the observed increase
in the number of high-skilled people. Notice, however, that the U.S. experience
is not shared by many other countries where the wage premium has remained
relatively ﬂat, but the number of high-skilled people has also increased. One
explanation of the latter experience would be to attribute this to a cancellation
of the counteracting eﬀects of ¯ and x.16
From the production function one immediately gets °y = °k so that for given
x per capita output and the capital-labour ratio grow at the same rate. With
constant N and x total output also grows at the same rate as the aggregate capital
stock. From (6) the consumption of the representative high-skilled agent grows
at °. Each high-skilled worker owns kh0 =
K0
Lh units of the initial capital stock.
Equation (5b) implies ˙ kh = wh + (1 ¡ #)rkh ¡ ch so that °kh =
wh¡ch
kh ¡ (1 ¡ #)r
where (1 ¡ #)r is constant. In steady state, °kh = °k is constant by deﬁnition.
But
wi











which implies °k = °. But then consumption of the low-skilled also grows at the
15The wage premium depends negatively on the number of high-skilled people, which captures
an important and realistic aspect in the explanation of wage inequality. See, for instance, Bound
and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992) or Autor, Krueger and Katz (1998).
16The idea that skill biased technological change within ﬁrms with its corresponding demand
for high-skilled labour and the (education system’s) supply of high-skilled people are in a ’run’
determining wage inequality over time can e.g. be found in Tinbergen (1975).
13rate °. Thus, the economy is characterized by balanced growth in steady state






² ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ®)A(1 + ¯x®) ¡ ½
º
(8)
which is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing, that is, concave in x.17 Thus, in
the model it is possible that an economy has high-skilled workers, but does not
necessarily do better than another economy with less high-skilled people.
For given x 2 (0;1) the eﬀect of a change in the productivity of the education






²2 º < 0. One also veriﬁes
d°
dc < 0 and
d°
d¯ > 0 for given
x. Furthermore, the direct transfers to the low-skilled workers are unproductive
in the model and granting more of them (higher Á) leads to lower growth.
Proposition 1 The long-run growth rate ° is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing
in x. For given x, a less productive education technology (higher ²) or a less eﬃ-
cient use of public resources in education (higher c) imply lower growth, whereas
a more skill-biased technology (higher ¯) implies higher growth. An increase in
direct, purely redistributive transfers to the low-skilled (higher Á) lowers long-run
growth.
Income Inequality. When relating growth to income inequality one should
look at an average of incomes over time. But data for such averages are rarely
available. Thus, the paper concentrates on simple inequality measures for current




º [¡∆1 + ∆2] where ∆1 = c
²x
1
²¡1(1 ¡ ®)A(1 + ¯x®) and ∆2 =
(1 ¡ cx
1
² ¡ Á)(1 ¡ ®)A®¯x®¡1. For x ! 0 we have
d°
dx = +1. When x ! 1 we have
d°
dx = ¡1
²c(1¡a)A(1+¯)+(1¡cÁ)(1¡®)A®¯ < 0. Furthermore, d∆1
dx > 0 and d∆2
dx < 0 imply
d
2°
dx2 < 0. These properties capture that expanding education may lead to lower growth under
some, especially congestive circumstances. See, for example, Temple (1999), p. 140.
14have been used extensively in the recent growth literature.18 Note that average
current income before (g) and after (n) taxes depends on time and is given by
¹g ´ wl(1 ¡ x) + whx + rkt and ¹n ´ wl(1 ¡ x) + Árkt + whx + (1 ¡ Á ¡ ¿)rkt.



















®(1 ¡ x) + Á(1 ¡ ®)(1 + ¯xa)




where use has been made of ¿ = cx
1
². The corresponding Lorenz Curve (LC),
which relates population shares to income shares, is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Ordinary Lorenz Curve
share in population
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The LC has a kink at the point A at which (1¡x) percent of the population
receive ¾l percent of total income. The Gini coeﬃcient is then calculated as








= 1 ¡ (¾l + x)
where the expression in square brackets represents the area under the LC.
18For a discussion of problems caused by using current income and a measure such as the
Gini coeﬃcient in a world where income is growing, see e.g. Shorrocks (1983), Fields (1987), or
Amiel and Cowell (1999).
15It is easy to see that ¾n
l > ¾
g
l so that the low-skilled get a larger share of
income after taxes than before taxes. If point A corresponds to the situation
before taxation then the income distribution after taxes would have a kink at a
point strictly above A and would imply a less unequal income distribution. See
Atkinson (1970). Furthermore, the Gini coeﬃcients for gross (Gg) and for net
(Gn) incomes, i.e.
G
g = 1 ¡ (¾
g
l + x) and G
n = 1 ¡ (¾
n
l + x); (10)
would report that as well, because ¾n
l > ¾
g
l implies Gg > Gn. Thus, taxation
for education as well as direct transfers have a long-run redistributive impact
reﬂected in the diﬀerence between the respective Gini coeﬃcients. For that reason
the paper uses (see e.g. Lambert (1993), chpt. 2)
Deﬁnition 1 (Redistribution) Income redistribution is measured by Π ´ Gg¡
Gn and captures the long-run redistributive impact of taxation used for education
and of the direct transfers granted to the low-skilled workers.
As a lot of current empirical growth research employs Gini coeﬃcients for the
measurement of income inequality, the deﬁnition appears to be a natural one to

















Growth, inequality and redistribution are complicated functions of x in the
model. In order to get an impression of its qualitative features I have calibrated
the model using the paper’s data for 13 OECD countries. Focusing on the per-
16centage of the population with tertiary education, which ranges from 10 to 26
percent with a sample mean of 15 percent, the following table presents simulations
based on ’reasonable’ parameter values.
Table 1: Numerical Simulation
x Gg Gn Π ° ¿
0.10 0.386 0.342 0.044 0.0195 0.027
0.15 0.392 0.345 0.047 0.0201 0.054
0.20 0.390 0.339 0.051 0.0202 0.089
0.25 0.382 0.327 0.056 0.0200 0.131
0.30 0.370 0.310 0.059 0.0194 0.179
Parameter values:
® = 0:7, ¯ = 1:13, c = 1:43, ² = 0:58
Á = 0:13, º = 3:55, ½ = 0:01
Thus, income inequality - as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient - as well as
growth ﬁrst increases, and then decreases with a rising number of people with
tertiary education.19 These simulated eﬀects are small. In particular, they are
smaller for the growth rate than for the distributional variables.
Clearly, measured redistribution is higher if the government directly transfers
more resources to the low-skilled (higher Á). However, in the relevant range
measured redistribution is also increasing in x and hence in ¿. But there is no
clear (functional) relation between inequality and redistribution. For instance,
when plotting Π(x) against Gg(x), it would be possible that two values of Π are
associated with the same Gg. Furthermore, higher x implies higher redistribution
Π but also ﬁrst higher and then lower growth.
19In an economy with income growth such as the one modelled here this property of the Gini
coeﬃcients often follows by construction. See Fields (1987).
17Proposition 2 For a given production and education technology and many pa-
rameter constellations (¯, c, ²),
1. the Gini coeﬃcients (Gg, Gn) for pre-tax or post-tax income inequality are
inverted U-shaped in x.
2. two economies with x1 > x may be characterized by G
g
1 = Gg but Π1 > Π
and °1 R °.
Thus, for suﬃciently high x an increase in it would lower pre-tax and post-tax
income inequality. Furthermore, such an increase would often also widen the gap
between them and with it redistribution as deﬁned here.
As x is an increasing function of ¿ for given parameters it follows that income
inequality is also inverted U-shaped in ¿. However, for the rest of the theoret-
ical analysis it is convenient to continue to work with x. Thus, the subsequent
analysis is phrased conditional on x, bearing in mind that x(¿(i);i) where i are
exogenously given, economically important fundamentals like the model’s ® or ².
These results, esp. the simulation results have to interpreted with some cau-
tion as they are sensitive to changes in the institutional and production features.







d¯ < 0; dGn
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d² = 0; dGn
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d² = 0 ) dΠ
d² > 0 (12c)
Proposition 3 For a given level of human capital (x),
1. a more skill-biased production (higher ¯) entails higher pre-tax and (even)
higher post-tax inequality and so lower redistribution.
182. a less eﬃcient use of public resources in education (higher c) or a less
productive education sector (higher ²) imply no change in pre-tax, but a
reduction in post-tax inequality and hence more redistribution.
The ﬁrst result follows because a higher ¯ has a direct and positive bearing on
the wages of the high-skilled and pre-tax capital income, but has no direct eﬀect
on tax revenues. As a consequence there is lower redistribution. The intuition for
the second result is the following: If it is relatively more diﬃcult to generate more
high-skilled people, higher taxes are called for. Thus, if two economies have the
same x the one with a less productive education sector must use more resources
to have that x, thereby redistributing relatively more income.20
The last result captures how diﬀerences in economic fundamentals may shape
the education-distribution-growth nexus. For instance, suppose two economies
have similarly productive education systems, ² = ²1, have the same level of human
capital and equal Ás. Assume that country 1 uses a more skill-biased technology
¯1 > ¯ = 1, but uses public funds less eﬃciently c1 > c = 1. Then depending on
the relative magnitude of c1 and ¯1, country 1 deﬁnitely exhibits more pre-tax
income inequality, but may be observed to redistribute more or less income.
20Recall that the result is conditional on x. Given that policy may react to a change in fun-
damentals there is nothing to preclude the possibility that a change in them produces diﬀerent
eﬀects in total. Notice also that the result applies only when income inequality is measured by
the Gini coeﬃcient. For instance, a higher ² may increase income inequality (given ¿) when
measuring it by the concept of Generalized Lorenz Curve Dominance. See Shorrocks (1983).
Thus, the results depend on which measurement concept one uses.
193 Empirical Evidence
3.1 Data and Methodology
Human capital is measured by the percentage of the population from 25 to 64
years of age which has attained at least upper secondary education (SECP) or
at least university-level (tertiary) education (TERP). Data for these variables
are provided by the OECD for 1996 and 34 countries. They collapse the time
series dimension into a single number by attaching weights to the human capital
composition of diﬀerent generations at a particular point in time and are taken to
represent a long-run process which is approximated by their time-averages over
the sample period.21
The nature of the human capital data also serves as a justiﬁcation for the
methodology employed. Although authors such as Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort
(1996) argue that growth should be investigated by means of dynamic panel data
methods, these methods may have their own problems as e.g. argued by Barro
(1997), p. 37, or Temple (1999), p. 132 and analyzed by Banerjee, Marcellino
and Osbat (2000). Therefore, the paper uses time averaged data and concen-
trates on simple statistics, the properties of which may also be relevant for more
sophisticated methods.
Valuable sources for data on income distributions for many countries are the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the secondary data-set of the World Income
Inequality Database (WIID). Both satisfy many minimum quality requirements.
But given that LIS provides a consistent data source which features as a large
21Notice the binary nature of the variables. Breaking them down by age cohorts reveals that
in almost all countries these percentages have risen over time. For a critical assessment of other
frequently employed data sources measuring human capital see de la Fuente and Dom´ enech
(2000).
20subset of the WIID, income inequality is measured by Gini coeﬃcients based on
LIS data ﬁrst.22
In an intertemporal framework one should measure inequality in long-run in-
comes. That would require calculating time-averages of incomes. Gini coeﬃcients
of such averages for large samples of countries do not exist. As an approximation
I take averages of Gini coeﬃcients over time and interpret those averages as the
Gini coeﬃcient of an average of income distributions at diﬀerent dates. Here
averages of Gini coeﬃcients for each country are taken for the period 1970-90
and are meant to reﬂect long-run within-country inequality.23
The income and recipient concept employed here is gross or net income per
household where the latter has been adjusted by the square root of household
members. For the LIS data these concepts are strictly adhered to.
For instance, Deininger and Squire (1998), Forbes (2000), Barro (2000), Baner-
jee and Duﬂo (2000), and others construct unadjusted inequality measures by
taking averages of Gini coeﬃcients based on gross or net income or adjusted (add
6 percentage points) Gini coeﬃcients based on expenditure, each for individual
or household income recipients, for each country and year according to some data
quality criteria. That procedure may yield large samples, but a lot of important
information is lost. On the importance of income and recipient concepts in the
measurement of inequality see, for instance, Cowell (1995) or Atkinson (1983).
22Another valuable source is the data-set compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996) which
forms a subset of WIID. Although their data-set covers more countries than LIS, it has many
problematic features that are discussed in detail by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). Further-
more, note that LIS satisﬁes all the quality requirements of Deininger and Squire, namely that
the data be based on (1) actual observation of individual units drawn from household surveys,
(2) a representative sample covering all of the population, and (3) comprehensive coverage of
diﬀerent income sources as well as population groups.
23Based on their own data-set Deininger and Squire (1998) also run their regressions on an
average of Gini coeﬃcients for the whole sample period. For the justiﬁcation, which is satisﬁed
here as well, see p. 268 of their paper. Thus, growth is not predicted to depend just on the
initial income distribution.
21The paper’s strict adherence to the income and recipient concepts minimizes
measurement error, but leads to a small sample. However, as a sensitivity check
results are also presented which are based on WIID data with some inconsistencies
that lead to larger samples.
Finally, long-run growth rates were calculated using the Penn World Table
(Mark 5.6) from Summers and Heston (1991). All the other data are taken from
Barro and Lee (1994). Combining these data sources with LIS data yields a
sample of 13 relatively rich countries for the period 1970-90 for which reliable
(good) inequality data are available.
3.2 Findings
For the LIS data the Gini coeﬃcient for individual households’ gross incomes
is denoted by LIS.G and that for individual households’ net incomes by LIS.N.
Furthermore, RE ´ LIS.G - LIS.N denotes redistribution. In the sample the Gini
coeﬃcients are characterized as follows:
Over the sample period income inequality has risen in some countries, but not
in all. Redistribution has increased in almost all. For instance, in the U.S. the
Gini coeﬃcient went up from 35.05 in 1974 to 41.81 in 1997. Thus, there was
a marked increase in pre-tax income inequality. For the same period the Gini
coeﬃcient for net income goes up from 31.46 in 1974 to 37.24 in 1997. On the
other hand redistribution (RE) goes up from 3.59 in 1974 to 4.57 in 1997. Thus,
policy in the U.S. has corrected slightly increasingly for some of the increase in
pre-tax inequality. A similar picture holds for the UK so that higher inequality
in pre-tax incomes often seems to be associated with more redistribution within
countries over time.
In France pre-tax income inequality has fallen over time, but redistribution
22has fallen too. Sweden has low pre-tax inequality which fell over the period
(1967: 32.05; 1995: 26.2). It reduced redistribution from 6 in 1967 to 4.2 in 1995.
Thus, Sweden and the U.S. have very diﬀerent pre-tax income inequality, but
redistribute approximately the same.
On period averages the U.S. redistributes more (RE: 4.4) than e.g. Germany
(RE: 3.7), France (RE: 2.49) or Canada (RE: 3.4). All the latter countries have
lower pre-tax inequality than the U.S. In Canada pre-tax inequality is low and
has hardly changed over the sample period. However, redistribution increased,
especially since the late 80s (RE 1971: 2.8; RE 1994: 4.3).
Due to the small sample size most of the simple correlations between the vari-
ables turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant. Somewhat surprisingly the simple
correlation between pre-tax income inequality LIS.G and redistribution RE is
negative and quite low (-0.08), suggesting that countries with higher inequal-
ity redistribute less. However, the relationship is only negative when approxi-
mated linearly (OLS) but it is U-shaped when approximated by a cubic spline
function.24 This would conﬁrm recent studies by e.g. B´ enabou (2000), Lee and
Roemer (1998), or Figini (1999).
Clearly, growth of GDP per capita should be controlled for by many factors.
This is done here by means of simple growth regressions and by focussing on
parsimonious models. Following a common procedure, a benchmark model with
often used robust regressors is used to add education and distributional variables
to see what the latter contribute to the ’explanation’ of long-run growth across
countries.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24The benchmark model used here for i countries is °i = ® + ¯1 LY70i +
¯2 LAFERTi + ¯3 CVLIBi + ²i where LY70 denotes the (natural) logarithm of
GDP per capita in 1970, LAFERT represents the logarithm of the average fer-
tility rate for the period 1960-84, CVLIB is Gastil’s index of civil liberties (from
1 to 7; 1=most freedom) for the period 1972-89 and ²i is a disturbance term.
According to the estimated coeﬃcients CVLIB does not really add to the ’expla-
nation’ of growth and is dropped in the subsequent analysis, because it is not the
main variable of interest.25
In Table 2 model (1) is the reduced benchmark model. In all models the
estimated coeﬃcient on LY70 is always negative and that on fertility (LAFERT)
is negative in ten out of the sixteen models. The estimates then suggest the
following:
The association between the human capital variables as well as the distribu-
tional variables and growth is not very strong. Most of the coeﬃcients on these
variables are statistically insigniﬁcant. However, even small eﬀects may have
important and economically signiﬁcant consequences in the long run.26 Bearing
in mind that due to the consistency requirement the sample size is small and
although given statistical insigniﬁcance the focus of this paper is on the point
estimates and their economic signiﬁcance, but not on inferential statistics.
1) The coeﬃcients on education are positive in all models. However, sec-
ondary education (SECP) appears to contribute more to linear ’explanations’
of long-run growth than tertiary education (TERP) or education expenditure
(GEDU). As an indication notice the relatively high R2s in models (2)-(5). For
instance, the latter models suggest that an increase of one standard deviation
25The estimate for ¯3 was 0:082 with a standard error of 0:378 and a t¡probability of 0:832.
26On the distinction between statistical and economic signiﬁcance see e.g. McCloskey (1985)
or McCloskey and Ziliak (1996).
25(11 percentage points) in the percentage of people aged 25-65 who have at least
upper secondary education (SECP) raises long-run growth by 0.3 to 0.4 per-
centage points. Models (6)-(9) suggest that growth would be raised by 0.08 to
0.1 percentage points when increasing by one standard deviation (4.8 percentage
points) the percentage of people aged 25-65 who have at least tertiary education
(TERP). In turn, a one-standard-deviation change (1.04 percentage points) of
more education expenditure would increase the growth rate by around 0.08 to
0.1 percentage points.
2) The coeﬃcients on redistribution (RE) are ambiguous and statistically
insigniﬁcant. When controlling for SECP they are positive, but they are negative
in all other cases. All coeﬃcients on RE suggest that it does not add much to
’explaining’ the cross-country variation in growth rates over the sample period.
3) When controlling for initial income and fertility, the coeﬃcients on pre-
tax and on post-tax income inequality are statistically insigniﬁcant but they
are always negative, no matter whether one also controls for education (SECP,
TERP, or GEDU). For instance, when controlling for secondary education SECP
in models (2)-(5) a one-standard-deviation change in pre-tax inequality (LIS.G)
of 3.67 lowers the long-run growth rate by 0.28 percentage points. The same
change for post-tax inequality (LIS.N) amounts to 3.88 and lowers the growth
rate by 0.26. Barro (2000) p. 18 and Perotti (1996) report similar magnitudes
for these eﬀects.
But when controlling for tertiary education (TERP) or overall spending on
education (GEDU) these eﬀects become quite smaller. E.g. in model (11) which
controls for GEDU a one-standard-deviation change in LIS.G (LIS.N) reduces
the growth rate by only 0.06 (0.01) percentage points.
4) Pre-tax income inequality (LIS.G) appears to be more strongly, negatively
26related to growth than post-tax income inequality (LIS.N).27
These ﬁndings suggest that more inequality in gross incomes seems to imply
lower growth for the typical country in the sample. Then the state intervenes
by redistribution. That intervention does not appear to aﬀect growth very much
in the typical country. However, the resulting inequality in personal incomes
after taxes is still negative. But that means that the state may not have inter-
vened enough to generate a situation where after-tax income inequality would
not negatively aﬀect growth anymore.
The negative association between pre-tax or post-tax income inequality and
growth also allows for an interpretation of results based on some forms of unad-
justed inequality measures. See Appendix A.5.
Lemma 1 If the ’true’ association between growth and pre-tax income inequality,
measured by the Gini coeﬃcient, is negative, then the estimated coeﬃcients on
unadjusted inequality measures based on mixes of Gini coeﬃcients for net and for
gross incomes are most likely to be biased upwards.
This means that the estimated non-negative signs found on the coeﬃcients
for unadjusted inequality measures used in the growth regressions of Barro (2000)
or Forbes (2000) allow for another interpretation: The ’true’ association between
pre-tax inequality and growth is negative. Post-tax inequality depends on pre-tax
inequality and redistribution. If you use the mix-generated unadjusted inequality
measure, you really run a regression on a variable containing information about
pre-tax inequality and redistribution, which - as argued before - are two diﬀerent,
although related things. Thus, a positive coeﬃcient in a growth regression may
27This may be discerned from Table 2 when comparing the estimated coeﬃcients for pre-tax
(LIS.G) and post-tax inequality (LIS.N). The ones for the latter are consistently smaller and
closer to zero than those found for LIS.G.
27also indicate that pre-tax inequality negatively ’aﬀects’ growth and redistribution
strongly positively ’aﬀects’ growth. Given this interpretation the call for a re-
assessment of the inequality-growth relationship may be premature.
Determinants of Inequality. The theory argues that education spending de-
termines human capital which in turn shapes the relationship between income
inequality and growth. Table 3 presents the ’eﬀects’ of some widely used deter-
minant factors of income inequality and redistribution.
Table 3: Determinants of Inequality (LIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent













































































































R2 0:660 0:720 0:774 0:620 0:730 0:770 0:051 0:204 0:207
Obs. 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
OLS. Standard errors in parentheses and t-probabilities in square brackets.
These regressions indicate that initial income and fertility are negatively re-
lated to equality and redistribution. Interestingly, less civil liberties (higher
CVLIB) correlate positively with equality and negatively with redistribution.
In turn, government spending on overall education (GEDU) is consistently nega-
tively associated with pre-tax and post-tax inequality, but it is positively related to
28redistribution. For instance, according to model (3), (6) and (9) a one-standard
deviation change (1.04 percentage points) in GEDU lowers pre-tax inequality
(LIS.G) by 1.5 percentage points, lowers post-tax inequality (LIS.N) by 1.8 per-
centage points and raises measured redistribution by 0.4 percentage points.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check whether the results carry over to less stringently deﬁned data
I have used Gini coeﬃcients for pre-tax and post-tax income provided by the
World Income Inequality Database (WIID).28 Only those coeﬃcients of the data-
set were used that are representative of all areas and the population of a country.
The major diﬀerence from LIS is that now the data come from various sources.
In a ﬁrst step only those entries were considered where the income recipient was
the household, unadjusted for its composition. In a second step a data-set was
created which does not distinguish whether and how the households have been
adjusted for their composition. Both procedures yield larger data-sets but the
results based on them are very similar. Therefore, I will only report the ones for
the ﬁrst procedure here.
One diﬃculty with these data is that one cannot easily tell what redistribution
is, because the coeﬃcients for gross and net income do not necessarily match. It
is possible that the time average of all the Gini coeﬃcients for gross income of a
country, now called AIHG, are unrealistically smaller than those for net income,
called AIHN. In order to be as consistent as possible, I have only considered a
28Another sensitivity check would have been to break the LIS data up into 5 or 10 year
intervals in order to see if the results remain robust for shorter time periods. Unfortunately,
this would have led to extremely small data-sets, making regression analysis almost impossible.
Furthermore, the paper’s focus is on the long-run and it is, therefore, left an open question
whether inequality and growth may be positively associated in the not so long run. For an
analysis relating inequality and growth over diﬀerent time spans see e.g. Forbes (2000).
29country’s coeﬃcients that match in terms of time and source for the determination
of the redistribution variable RE. Interestingly, most of the entries then turn out
to originate from LIS, but for unadjusted households.
One advantage of being less stringent is that the sample size increases by up
to 70 percent. Table 4 presents growth regressions using the WIID data.
Most of the coeﬃcients are statistically insigniﬁcant. This holds even for so
called robust regressors such as fertility (LAFERT) and initial income (LY70).
The latter are, however, negatively related to growth in the majority of regres-
sions.
The educational variables (SECP, TERP, GEDU) are generally positively
related to growth, unless one controls for post-tax income inequality (AIHN).
However, the most important ﬁnding is that as with the LIS data the variables
for pre-tax inequality (AIHG) as well as those for post-tax inequality (AIHN) and
redistribution (RE) are negatively related to growth. The negative coeﬃcients on
income inequality are generally more statistically insigniﬁcant than when using
the LIS data. Furthermore, the linear ﬁts of most models are doing badly. As an






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31The next table presents the results for the determinants of inequality. Here
the ﬁts have quite high R2s but still most variables are statistically insigniﬁ-
cant. Initial income (LY70) and fertility (LAFERT) are positively associated
with pre-tax (AIHG) and post-tax inequality (AIHN). In contrast to the LIS
data redistribution is now positively related to LY70 and LAFERT. See Table 3.
The important ﬁnding here is that the correlation between education spending
(GEDU) and pre-tax as well as post-tax income inequality is negative and that
between GEDU and redistribution is positive.29
As mentioned before all the results based on the WIID also hold when one
does not distinguish whether and how the households have been adjusted for their
composition.
Table 5: Determinants of Inequality (WIID)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent













































































































R2 0:781 0:783 0:791 0:738 0:776 0:799 0:220 0:536 0:658
Obs. 22 22 22 21 21 21 13 13 13
OLS. Standard errors in parentheses and t-probabilities in square brackets.
29The same conclusion can be reached when controlling for secondary (SECP) or tertiary
education (TERP) instead of education spending (GEDU). See the data appendix.
32The sensitivity checks therefore suggest the following for the diﬀerent data:
Being less consistent in the deﬁnition of key variables in order to get a larger sam-
ple and sharper results does not turn out to be a successful strategy. The results
based on the consistent data are broadly sharper in that the regression coeﬃ-
cients are usually more statistically signiﬁcant and the regressions feature higher
R2s. But for both data-sets the association between distribution and growth as
well as distribution and education (ﬁnance) is generally found to be statistically
insigniﬁcant. However, there is some indication that income inequality before and
after taxes but also redistribution as measured here is bad for long-run growth.
Furthermore, more education and more resources spent on it are usually found
to be beneﬁcial for long-run growth. They also seem to reduce income inequality
and are positively related to redistribution.
3.4 The Role of the Schooling Technology
A common measure of the (internal) ineﬃciency in schooling is the dropout rate
of students enrolled in particular educational programmes. Recently, the OECD
has provided data on dropout rates for students enrolled at the university-level
tertiary education, covering many OECD countries for the 1990s.30 These data
are used here under the heroic assumption that diﬀerences in these rates reﬂect
structural diﬀerences that have not changed much across countries and over a long
time horizon. Furthermore, it should be viewed as a composite index depending
on c and ². Thus, the results below depend on these assumptions and are therefore
only suggestive.
30The World Bank and UNESCO also provide data on these rates for some coun-
tries, but unfortunately only up to 8th grade and excluding important countries like the
U.S. For more information consult: www:worldbank:org=data=wdi2000=pdfs=tab2 11:pdf and
unescostat:unesco:org=en=stats=stats0:htm.
33Dropout rates are available for ten of the countries in the LIS sample. In
order to relate consistently to the earlier ﬁndings based on the larger LIS sample
of 13 countries, the dropout rates for Norway, Sweden and Canada have been
set at the average dropout rate (30.1) of the sample excluding these countries.
The data appendix shows that all the results below would remain valid when
working with the reduced LIS sample of ten countries. Furthermore, it discusses
the sensitivity of the results to other interpolations.
Table 6 presents regression results when controlling for policy changes by
means of interaction terms. These capture how diﬀerences in structure aﬀect
diﬀerences in policy.
Table 6: Determinants of Inequality and Growth 2 (LIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent

































































































R2 0:309 0:265 0:216 0:291 0:269 0:248 0:147 0:235
Obs. 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
OLS. Standard errors in parentheses and t-probabilities in square brackets.
Means: ¹TERP = 14:80;¹GEDU = 5:62;¹DROP = 30:1
In terms of the paper’s theory the coeﬃcients on these terms can take any
34sign.31
The regressions indicate that most of the relationships are statistically in-
signiﬁcant. The point estimates in turn suggest that when controlling for the
dropout rate and for policy reactions, more education and more spending on it
may raise growth (G70-90) and reduce income inequality, but also redistribution.
However, when taking account of policy reactions, that is, when looking at the
total eﬀect of education expenditure GEDU (tertiary education, TERP) around
the sample mean, it turns out that policy is such that more education expen-
diture GEDU (tertiary education, TERP) seems to lower income inequality but
raises redistribution and growth.32
The coeﬃcients on the drop-out rate DROP appear to conﬁrm that countries
where it is more diﬃcult to generate education have lower inequality. But they
also seem to be those that redistribute less. But the latter is only true if one
controls for the interaction terms. The total eﬀect is that around the sample
mean an increase in DROP raises pre-tax and post-tax inequality but lowers
redistribution and growth.
In terms of the model this suggests that c and ² may not be independent of
one another or may be very diverse across countries. Furthermore, one may argue
that these variables are also related to ¯. For instance, W¨ alde (2000) shows that
the structure of education systems (elitist vs. egalitarian) may inﬂuence the skill
intensity in production. In that sense the estimates here would support such an
argument.
31Clearly, the problem of endogeneity of policy plays an important part in any cross-country
growth analysis. See e.g. Rehme (2000).
32For instance, the total eﬀect of TERP on RE is given by ¡0:305 + 0:011 ¤ 30:1 = 0:032.
354 Concluding Remarks
This paper argues that education directly aﬀects growth and income inequality.
In the model pre-tax and post-tax income inequality - measured by the Gini
coeﬃcient - as well as growth are ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in education.
It is shown that a less eﬃcient schooling system would require more redistributive
education expenditure for a given level of education.
The data, which are based on consistent concepts for the measurement of
inequality, provide some evidence that, when controlling for various factors such
as initial income or fertility, long-run growth is higher for countries that (a) spend
more on education, (b) have lower pre-tax and lower post-tax income inequality.
The data also suggest that countries with a more productive, public education
technology exhibit lower income inequality and higher growth. The paper does
not ﬁnd an indication that higher pre-tax or post-tax income inequality is good
for growth in rich countries.
The consistent negative relation between pre-tax and post-tax inequality and
growth in the data suggests that mixing Gini coeﬃcients based on gross or on
net incomes is most likely to produce an upward bias when measuring the eﬀect
of unadjusted measures of inequality on growth.
It also indicates that if a rich country spent more on public education it
could raise growth and lower pre-tax and post-tax inequality, given its education
technology.
However, a more precise disentanglement of the interaction between educa-
tion policy and education technology, and their eﬀects on growth and inequality
appears to be called for and should be an interesting topic for further research.
36A Technical Appendix
A.1 An Alternative OLG Set-Up
The assumption of unequal capital ownership may also be justiﬁed as follows: Consider a two-
period OLG model, where each agent has one oﬀspring. Assume that establishing a ﬁrm requires
a certiﬁcate which is related to education. At each moment the government picks some (new
born, no matter whether the parents are high or low-skilled) people to be educated in period
1, who complete their degrees and open up their own ﬁrms in period 2. Those who are not
picked go to the same school but attend lower level courses in period 1, and consequently work
as low-skilled workers in period 2. This means that old (dying) high-skilled people only pass on
capital to high skilled people, but never to low-skilled people, including their own (potentially)
low skilled oﬀspring. For if they did, the latter would not be allowed or be capable to operate
the ﬁrm and capital would depreciate instantaneously. This would mean that passing on capital
from a (dying) high-skilled entrepreneur to a low-skilled oﬀspring who can only ’eat’ the capital
would not be in the interest of all the other agents. The other low-skilled (oﬀspring) would not
like it, because it would reduce their steady state wages. The high skilled (oﬀspring) would
not like it because they would have to share less capital. By assumption the representative
government is taken to pass legislation to forbid such ineﬃcient transfers.
A.2 Technology
By assumption Yt = AtH®
t K
1¡®
t , where the index of eﬀective labour H depends on labour
requiring basic skills (B) and labour requiring high skills (S). Labour requiring basic skills
is performed by high and low-skilled persons, B = B(Ll;Lh), whereas high-skilled labour is
only performed by high-skilled persons, S = S(Lh). High and low-skilled people are perfect
substitutes to each other when performing basic skill (routine) tasks, i.e. B(Ll;Lh) = Ll +Lh.
Thus, high-skilled people also perform those routine tasks a low-skilled person may do.33 On the
other hand, only high-skilled people can perform high-skilled tasks (labour) and for simplicity








½, where ¯ measures the productivity with which tasks requiring high skills
contributes to the generation of output. For ½ < 1 labour requiring basic skills (B) and labour
requiring high skills (S) are imperfect (less than perfect) substitutes. For ease of calculations
let ½ = ® < 1 which yields equation (1).
33For instance, Lindbeck and Snower (1996) show that ﬁrms may organize production so
that people perform one particular task (Tayloristic organization) or various tasks (holistic
organization). In the model only high-skilled people are capable of performing several tasks
and ﬁrms use a mixture of Tayloristic and holistic organization.




Equation (2) is compatible with many models that also use high-skilled labour as an input
generating education. For instance, let ht denote the total stock of human capital in the
economy in a discrete time model. Assume that human capital evolves according to ht+1 =
f(Gt;Kt;ht)ht where new human capital ht+1 is produced by non-increasing returns. See
e.g. Azariadis and Drazen (1990). Here human capital formation would depend on the level of
the stock of knowledge ht, government resources provided for education Gt and the tax base
rtKt. The function f(¢) governs the evolution of human capital. Assume that it is separable in





= q(¿) and for simplicity
ht+1 = q(¿) h
¯
t ; where q ¸ 0; q0 > 0; q00 · 0; 0 < ¯ < 1:
where ¯ measures the productivity of the education sector and q(¿) captures the quality of
education, depending on the government resources channelled into education. See, for example,
eqns. (1), (2) in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).
In the model human capital is carried discretely so ht = xtN. Normalize population by
setting N = 1. Then total human capital at date t is given by xt. In steady state ¯ x = xt = xt+1
and so ¯ x = q(¿)
1
1¡¯. Next suppose that the quality of education is described by q(¿) = ˜ ¿¹ where
˜ ¿ = ¿
c denotes the eﬃciently used resources in education and 0 < ¹ < 0. For non-increasing
returns to scale it is necessary that ¹ + ¯ · 1. Let
¹
1¡¯ ´ ² then the more explicit set-up
would be equivalent to (2) in steady state. As ¯ x² < 0, any increase ² would mean that less
human capital is generated in steady state. From non-increasing returns to scale it follows that
¹ · 1 ¡ ¯ so that ² · 1.
A.4 Calibration
Following Mankiw (1995) a high skilled worker is taken to earn three times as much as a low
skilled worker. As the correlation between total government spending and the share of the
population with tertiary education is quite high and given the data for the internal eﬃciency
in tertiary education, the paper calibrates the model for the share of the population that has
tertiary education. The mean in the sample is 0:15. (See Table 7.) Thus, ¯ satisﬁes




I assume ® = 0:7 so that ¯ = 1:13. The capital/output ratio is taken be equal 3:0 so that
Y
K
= A(1 + ¯x®) (A2)
from which A = 0:26. The discount factor ½ is set at 0:01. To get an estimate of the eﬃciency
c and of the productivity ² in schooling I have proceeded as follows:
The total government spending on education in terms of GDP (GEDU) is related to ¿ by
¿ = gx
Y
rK where gx is proxied by GEDU. Since Y
rK = 1
1¡® = 10
3 the data imply a value of
38¿ = 0:18. I have then used the variable DROP to get an estimate of the eﬃciency of resources
used in education. More precisely, I have taken 1 ¡ DROP
100 as a measure of 1
c. From the
regression lnTERP = constant + ¯1 ln(¿





and is given by ² = 0:58.
I have then chosen Á so that the ratio of the Gini coeﬃcients before and after taxes is
87 percent as in the data and so that their diﬀerence is around 4 percentage points. The Á
necessary for that is Á = 0:13. Lastly, calibrating the growth rate required º = 3:65 implying
an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of around 27 percent.
A.5 Unadjusted Inequality Measures
Suppose you mix Gini coeﬃcients for net and gross incomes to get an unadjusted inequality
index I which is then used in growth regressions.
The model really run: °u
i = a + b G
g
i + c Gn
i + ²i
The model run: °u




i ) + ²0
i
where °u
i is the residual of the regression of °i on a vector of control variables. For simplicity
assume that the control variables are not correlated or even orthogonal to the distributional
variables. Commonly °u
i is called the unexplained part of the growth rate. The latter is




i for country i.
This is true by the deﬁnition of RA
i as a measure of redistribution. Not every observation in G
g
i
may necessarily have a corresponding matching value of Gn
i in the data set. However, values
of Gn
i are included by many NCV proponents in order to boost the number of observations.
Now what is basically done is to create Ii = G
g
i + Gn
i . But this means Ii = G
g
i + ˜ G
g




i and ˜ RA
i may be unknown if there is no matching value for G
g
i available in the
data set. This implies that their estimate for b0, call it ˆ b0, would contain information of the
distribution of gross incomes, but also information on redistribution. Thus, the model they run
is °u
i = a + b G
g
i + c ˜ G
g
i ¡ c ˜ RA
i + ²i which puts a restriction on the eﬀect that ˜ RA
i exerts.
Relaxing it and noting that ˜ G
g
i and ˜ RA
i are unknown, when there are no matching values in G
g
i,
the regression is really run on values of known Gini coeﬃcients for gross incomes, some unknown
Gini values for gross income and some unknown values for redistribution. But consequently
their ’true’ model is
°u
i = a + b G
g
i + c ˜ G
g
i + d ˜ RA
i + ²i
where d = ¡c. But this suggests the following argument: The estimates for b and c have often
been found to be negative in earlier contributions. Furthermore, there is an empirical literature
that shows that the estimate for d is likely to be positive. Thus, you have an upward bias for
the estimate of b0. This bias may be so strong that you may even get a positive estimate for
b0 = b + c + d, that is, ˆ b0 ¸ 0 is compatible with ˆ b < 0;ˆ c < 0 and ˆ d > 0.
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432 Data Appendix
Data Sources
² Barro and Lee (1994). Web site: www.nber.org/data/.
² Summers and Heston (1991): Penn World Table (Mark 5.6). Web site:
www.nber.org/data/.
² OECD Education Database: Education at a Glance 1998, Table A1.
² OECD Education Database: Education at a Glance 2000, Table C4.1.
² Deininger and Squire (1996). Web site:
www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm.
² Luxembourg Income Study. Web site: www.lisproject.org.
² World Income Inequality Database (WIID). Web site:
www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
Deﬁnition of variables34
G70-90 Average growth rate of real GDP per capita for the period 1970-1990 in percentage points,
where G70-90 =
ln yT ¡ln y0
T and yT denotes per capita GDP at ﬁnal date T. (Source: Penn
World Tables, Mark 5.6.)
SECP Percentage of the population from 25 to 64 years of age who have attained at least upper
secondary education, 1996. (Source: OECD, 1998)
TERP Percentage of the population from 25 to 64 years of age who have attained at least university-
level education, 1996. (Source: OECD, 1998)
LIS.G Average Gini coeﬃcient for gross income of households (adjusted for household size by the
square root of the number of household members) for the period 1970-1990. (Source: Lux-
embourg Income Study)
AIHG Average Gini coeﬃcient for gross income of households for the period 1970-1990 (Source:
WIID)
LIS.N Average Gini coeﬃcient for net income of households (adjusted for household size by the
square root of the number of household members) for the period 1970-1990. (Source: Lux-
embourg Income Study)
AIHN Average Gini coeﬃcient for net income of households for the period 1960-1990 (Source:
WIID)
LY70 Natural logarithm of the level of real GDP per capita in 1970. (Source: Penn World Tables,
Mark 5.6; Variable: RGDPL, i.e. real GDP per capita in 1985 international prices.)
AFERT Average fertility rate (children per woman) for the period 1960-84. (Source: Barro-Lee).
GEDU Government expenditure on education as a fraction of GDP for the period 1960-1985 in
percentage points. (Source: Barro-Lee)
CVLIB Gastil’s index of civil liberties (from 1 to 7; 1 = most freedom) for the period 1972-1989.
(Source: Barro-Lee)
DROP Drop-out rates at the university-level tertiary education from 1985-96. (Source: OECD 2000)
34 A more detailed description of the data and the results is provided at:
http://www.tu-darmstadt.de/»rehme/project/data01.htm.
44Table 7: Sample based on LIS
G70-90 LIS.G LIS.N RE SECP TERP GEDU LY70 AFERT CVLIB DROP
Finland 2.75 26.04 20.89 5.15 66.79 13.52 5.76 9.00 1.97 1.94 25
Norway 3.09 26.94 22.89 4.05 81.59 15.57 6.26 8.99 2.32 1.00 30¤
Sweden 1.57 27.03 22.32 4.71 74.20 13.37 7.10 9.28 1.96 1.00 30¤
Denmark 1.82 28.06 24.37 3.69 66.09 15.25 6.27 9.18 2.01 1.00 33
Germany 2.09 29.16 25.80 3.37 81.47 13.10 4.03 9.15 1.89 1.64 28
Netherlands 1.74 29.47 25.53 3.94 62.54 22.54 6.95 9.13 2.27 1.00 30
France 2.07 30.38 28.77 1.61 60.22 9.73 4.37 9.13 2.54 1.86 45
U.K. 2.19 31.98 28.76 3.22 76.31 12.77 5.25 9.05 2.26 1.00 19
Canada 2.64 32.27 29.03 3.24 76.41 17.31 6.82 9.22 2.36 1.00 30¤
Australia 1.47 34.30 29.25 5.05 56.95 14.84 4.73 9.28 2.60 1.00 35
Switzerland 1.21 34.40 31.90 2.50 80.17 9.53 4.50 9.47 1.98 1.00 26
U.S.A. 1.66 36.07 32.07 4.281 85.66 25.80 5.94 9.47 2.21 1.00 37
Ireland 3.07 37.04 32.47 4.58 50.22 10.74 5.05 8.52 3.58 1.22 23
Min. 1.21 26.04 20.89 1.61 50.22 9.53 4.03 8.52 1.89 1.00 19
Max. 3.09 37.04 32.46 5.15 85.66 25.80 7.10 9.47 2.60 1.94 45
Mean 2.11 31.03 27.23 3.80 70.66 14.80 5.62 9.14 2.30 1.21 30.1
SD 0.61 3.67 3.88 1.02 10.98 4.80 1.04 0.24 0.44 0.36 7.6
Ordered in ascending order of the Gini coeﬃcients for gross income of households LIS.G. The dropout rates for
Norway, Sweden and Canada are based on an average when excluding these countries from the sample. 1 - based
on time matching Gini values only. See the data appendix for a justiﬁcation and a discussion of its implications.
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